The world was shocked to witness terrorist attacks being carried out at different places inside Israel on Oct 07, 2023. Israel’s intelligence agency, Mossad, had failed. This was a wake-up call to intelligence agencies across the world. 1,000 terrorists were prepared for this attack over 2 years right under the nose of Israeli agencies.
Mossad has a mammoth budget of $3 billion and 7,000 employees, yet it could not predict such a massive attack where 700 people have been declared dead and hundreds of others injured. The irony is, on October 1st, Israel’s National Security advisor, Zachi Honeyi, said that for the past 2 years, Hamas has not initiated any rocket launches as a part of its decision to curb its violence.
Israeli experts have now come forward to explain how in four steps Mossad was fooled. This can happen to any intelligence agency across the world. The four steps were Deception, Coordination, Narrative Building, final execution and diversion tactics.
Retired military General Yakov Amidor, who served as Israel’s National Security adviser between 2011 and 2013, points out three levels of failure. There was an operational failure of Israeli intelligence services to detect the well-organized attack. Then there was the Army’s inability to block it, and finally, Israel’s broader take on Hamas was entirely flawed. He said, “We made a huge mistake, including me, in believing a terror organization can change its DNA.”
Between 2021 and 2023, Israel was undergoing a politically turbulent phase. This is when Netanyahu and the ex-Mossad chief were accused of corruption. The country saw an unprecedented amount of protest, and Naftali Bennett’s government had come, though it lasted for just one year. All that while, Hamas was planning an attack on Israel. Israel was also concentrating on the Ukraine war. Earlier this year in January, America had moved its ammunition from Israel to Ukraine.
(1) The deception phase started with Hamas managing to create an impression that their focus was on the economy while Hamas conducted training for an attack even in plain sight. Israel, in turn, misinterpreted this training as mere posturing. As per the Hamas-related group statement, the final plan was made in August. Iranian IRGC officers have collaborated with Hamas since August to strategize for an aerial, terrestrial, and maritime invasion. But the practice for this began as early as 2021.
During the final attack, terrorists used bulldozers, hang gliders, and motorbikes to challenge the most powerful army in the Middle East. In the last 2 years, Hamas has managed to conceal its military plans and convince Israel that they are not seeking a confrontation. While we believed that a radical body that takes power gradually becomes moderate, Hamas was gaining strength and preparing for the next stage of their war.
(2) Coordination: Meanwhile, during its meetings with IRGC officials in Beirut, Lebanon, Hamas came up with a strategy aimed at creating a situation similar to the surprise attack that occurred during the Yom Kippur War 50 years ago when Egypt and Syria caught Israel off guard, forcing it to fight for its existence.
On the other side, Israel believed that economic progress in Gaza would reduce radicalization. Gaza is economically poor because it is isolated. After Gaza was taken over by Hamas in 2007, nobody from Gaza was allowed to work inside Israel. But after 15 years, Israel changed its heart. In 2021, just 7,000 Palestinians could work inside Israel. By 2023, the demand for work permits had risen to 20,000. Hamas’s strategy was clear; instead of carrying out smaller attacks, they would carry out one massive attack overwhelming the Israeli forces. Hence, Hamas over the last few years had been publicly projecting an image of reluctance to engage in a fight or confrontation with Israel while secretly preparing for the large-scale operation.
(3) Narrative Building: Hamas’s display of restraint in fighting Israel generated a lot of public criticism from some of its supporters, to reinforce the perception that Hamas was primarily concerned with economic issues rather than initiating a new war. In the West Bank, some individuals ridiculed Hamas for maintaining a low profile. In a statement by Fatah in June 2022, Hamas leaders were accused of leaving their people in poverty in Gaza while living in luxurious villas and hotels in Arab capitals. Israeli agencies believe that Yahya Al Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, was more focused on governing Gaza than on hostile actions towards Israel. During this time, Israel shifted its attention away from Hamas as it pursued a deal to normalize relations with other countries in the Middle East.
(4) The final execution: Iran granted final approval for the recent attack involving Hummers in Beirut just last week. The report also reveals that Iranian security officials assisted in planning Hamas’s unexpected attack on Israel, with authorization given during a meeting in Beirut last Monday. Israel has traditionally prided itself on its ability to infiltrate and monitor terrorist groups. This is why Hamas needed to prevent any leaks of information. Many Hamas leaders were kept in the dark about the plans, and even the thousand terrorists involved in the assault did not know the exact purpose of their training exercises.
On the day of the operation, it was divided into four parts:
- The initial phase involved launching a barrage of 3,000 rockets from Gaza while simultaneously conducting incursions by terrorists who used hang gliders or motorized paragliders to cross the border.
- Once the terrorists on hang gliders had touched down, they secured the area to facilitate the entrance of commando-trained terrorists who aimed to breach the fortified electronic cement wall built by Israel to prevent infiltration. Explosives were used by the terrorists to breach the barriers, and they rapidly crossed over on motorbikes.
- Bulldozers were employed to widen the gaps, allowing additional terrorists to enter using four-wheel drives.
- Taking hostages – this strategy worked massively in Hamas’s favour. Hamas knew Israel would retaliate, and hence taking hostages was important. Terrorists who were commando-trained assaulted the Israeli Army’s Southern Gaza headquarters and disrupted its communication systems, rendering the soldiers unable to contact their commanders or colleagues.
The last phase involved the transfer of hostages to Gaza, which was largely accomplished during the early stages of the attack. Terrorists kidnapped partygoers leaving a rave near the kibbutz of Relim near Gaza. As gunshots were heard, dozens of people were captured on social media racing through the fields and down the road. The Israeli Security Source questioned how could this party occur this close to Gaza. The Israeli Security Forces also claimed that due to certain troops being redeployed to the West Bank to safeguard Israeli settlers after a spike of violence between them and terrorists, Israeli troops were not at full strength in the southern part of the country near Gaza. This was what was exploited by Hamas.
Political chaos, a few years of internal turbulence, misjudging the enemy’s capability to overwhelm, and distraction—this is what led to the massive terrorist attack.
Israel declared a full-scale war now on Hamas. But the Hamas, in these two odd years have exercised the Israeli style of fighting the enemy very well. They have counted the Israeli Air Attack and are prepared for it. They are now moving across the breadth of Israel to reach the West Bank. The IDF is not in a very good position as of now. Until and Unless Israel puts Boots on the Ground, this war is not going anywhere. The sooner Israel takes the hard route, the war too would be in their control.
Israel may also face a two-front war if Hezbollah also jumps into the conflict. Hope the presence of the USS Gerald R. Ford in the vicinity will counter that. Let’s hope peace returns to the region soon.
