One may consider China’s seemingly irresistible economic rise, but, in reality, the challenges in the medium term are significant. China is at risk of ageing before it becomes rich, turning into a grey society with a fundamental economic downturn that hinders growth. The working-age population is already shrinking; By 2050, there will be two retired workers per eight people in China. Moreover, it has already reduced the greater productivity gains as the population becomes more educated and urbanized and adopts technology to make production more efficient. China is emerging from a productive space to invest in infrastructure, and rising debt levels will further complicate its growth path. In the last decade alone, China’s debt has more than doubled, from 141 per cent in 2008 to more than 300 per cent in 2019. Continuously increasing debt will definitely stand as an obstacle to its economical and industrial supremacy.
The political system is becoming increasingly sclerotic as power becomes more Xi-centered. Once famous for its technocratic skills, the Chinese Communist Party is becoming more and more known for its Leninist severity. The scope of local leadership and administration seem to be shrinking, as more decisions are originating from Beijing. The top-down nature of the system has made it more difficult for officials to reconcile past decisions or report bad news to the top. The leadership has become increasingly concerned and uncompromising in addressing the perceived challenges to its authorities.
Not limited to Xinjiang, Beijing’s tough policy to impose its will on the country’s peripheral region could bring future problems. Externally, China faces major obstacles to its ambitions. Beijing’s crackdown on the country, its resilience abroad, and its attempts to conceal critical preliminary details surrounding the coronavirus epidemic have contributed to the growing negative attitude towards China. According to Pew Polling since October 2020, China’s hostile attitude has reached historic highs across the country. In the coming years, Beijing may face increasing budget constraints for its larger foreign enterprises, as it struggles with both a cold economy and the growing demands of an older society.
Authoritarian systems excel at showcasing their strengths and concealing their weaknesses. But there are huge differences between the image Beijing presents and the realities. China is the second most powerful country in the world and the most formidable competitor the United States has faced in decades. Yet at the same time, and in spite of its many visible defects, the United States remains the stronger power in the U.S.-Chinese relationship—and it has good reason to think it can stay that way. For all the obstacles facing the United States, those facing China are considerably greater. It is true even for the Presidents of both the countries and their political careers. I’ll explain why.
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The most important fact about Chinese elite politics is that there’s a lot we don’t know. What we know is, China is an authoritarian country governed by a communist party that operates a sophisticated propaganda apparatus and exercises tight control over the information environment. It is virtually impossible to glean unfiltered insight into the personal beliefs, political networks, and policy deliberations of the leadership that oversees the world’s second-largest economy. And it is going through the worst nightmare in the last couple of years of Xi Jinping’s rule.
This information vacuum creates uncertainty and political risk. Many analysts believe that China’s current leader Xí Jìnpíng will rule for life. Others think the party may force Xi to name a successor. Some even argue that insiders will launch a coup against him. Concrete evidence like personnel movements and policy documents can only yield a limited range of conclusions.
The most significant event on the Chinese political calendar is the quinquennial National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This meeting brings thousands of delegates to Beijing to hear a major policy report by the CPC General Secretary, to approve amendments to the CPC Constitution, and to select the 370-odd members of the next CPC Central Committee. The 20th Party Congress will likely meet in October or November of 2022.
Then the true action starts. Immediately following the Party Congress, the new Central Committee will hold its first plenary session, at which it will select an elite 25-member Politburo, the 7-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), and the top leader as General Secretary. The politicians who fill these positions wield enormous power in Chinese policymaking.
Xi Jinping became General Secretary after the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 and won a second term at the 19th Party Congress. The expectation, both inside and outside the CPC, was that he would follow the example set by his predecessors Hú Jǐntāo and Jiāng Zémín of stepping down from the top role after serving two full five-year terms. This belief was bolstered by an unsaid norm that leaders aged 68 or older in the year of a Party Congress had to retire from the Politburo. In 2022, the year of the 20th Party Congress, Xi will turn 69.
But Xi moved quickly to reverse a trend toward “collective leadership” in the CPC and has become the “core leader” of a far more personalized political system. He crippled rival power centres, elevated close associates to key positions, centralized decision-making in powerful commissions that he controls, and re-established authority over the armed forces. In March 2018, the legislature scrapped term limits for the Chinese presidency (the position Xi holds as head of state), removing the only formal barrier to Xi serving as leader indefinitely.
These developments lead many analysts to argue that Xi will secure a norm-defying third term as General Secretary. Others contend that Xi’s position is doubtful because his policies — which target rival elites, suppress civil society, slow economic growth, and alienate other countries — could generate a backlash within the CPC against his continued rule. Either way, the outcome of the 20th Party Congress will have a profound impact on China’s future.
When you declare that You are President for Life, then it is obvious that one who wants to end your presidency will try to end your life. And that is being tried for the last 20 months. Xi Jinping’s life is in danger. Several attempts have been made by senior officials, businessmen, Police and Military personnel to kill Xi. That’s why Xi operates from his residence and residence only. He seldom gets out in the public. He does not even visit foreign countries for bilateral or multilateral meetings.
China is searching for options and ways to replace Xi. In his two-term tenure, Xi has taken China to a greater high. But, in his second term, he has become more of a dictator than a chosen one. His obnoxious decessions have started to take China down again. Today, more than half of the World want China destroyed, and almost all of China wants Xi replaced, all because of Xi Jinping himself. And Xi knows that.
Possible Alternatives to Xi and his inner circle:
Li Keqiang has been the second-ranked PBSC member after Xi since the 18th Party Congress and has served as Premier of the State Council since March 2013. During the 1990s and 2000s, Li and Xi were both rising stars in the CPC. Xi was from an elite political family and won the favour of former leader Jiang Zemin, while Li’s power base was the now-hobbled Communist Youth League (CYL) that nurtured Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao.
Li is constitutionally barred from serving another five-year term as Premier. But he will only turn 67 in 2022, and so falls within the age norm for reappointment to the PBSC. As it’s uncommon for senior leaders to retire early, Li may remain on the PBSC but move to a different role.
Chen Min’er is a key figure in the next generation of political leaders. He is in Politburo as CPC Secretary of Chongqing, a position that preceded PBSC membership for Hè Guóqiáng, Zhāng Déjiāng, and Wāng Yáng. Having headed the provincial propaganda department when Xi was Zhejiang Party Secretary from 2002-2007, Chen is viewed as a pedigree of Xi, who prefers to promote people he knows personally. Turning 62 next year, Chen is young enough to serve two PBSC terms under prevailing retirement age norms.
Hu Chunhua has been a rising star in Chinese politics for many years. He serves on the Politburo as one of four Vice Premiers of the State Council, the administrative leadership body of the Chinese central government. He is the youngest Politburo member — he will turn 59 in 2022 — and is the only Vice Premier not due to retire in 2022. That makes him the obvious candidate to succeed Li Keqiang as Premier and join the PBSC. Since 1980, a new Premier has always been selected from among the current Vice Premiers.
The only thing that can save Xi Jinping from all these is one or more than one “Conflict”. Active conflict with neighbours or small war during mid-2022 can very well give him another opportunity to be in power for the third time. No one would think of changing the old president in the middle of a conflict. Xi Jinping knows that too.
An Interesting fact is, the United States of America also will go for Midterm Elections in Nov 2022. 08th Nov 2022 to be precise. Joe Biden’s approval rating is going down consistently since he became POTUS. His latest approval rating is 36%. His predecessor, Mr Donald Trump, is breathing over his neck. Biden’s Afghanistan mismanagement, dipping economy, sky-rocketing inflation, border crisis, immigrant issues….. Biden has a lot of ‘Nah’s against him. The world has started to speculate that the US, under Biden’s presidency, will not stand by even Taiwan.
His image may see an upward movement if the US successfully defends Taiwan in the event of China attacking Taiwan. In China, regaining Taiwan is a patriotic emotional issue. If Xi tries to regain Taiwan in the Mid-2022 and continue the effort till the National Congress is over, then he will surely regain the presidency, if not Taiwan. And in the US, if the Biden administration successfully defends Taiwan till the midterm election is over, then Biden may get another chance too. Both Biden and Xi know this. And they are working on it.
All the escalated border issues with India is part of the same strategy. Xi needs a war to survive. India knows this. India will try to hold its position till the end of 2022 and try to avoid any kind of major conflict involving China. Even the PoK issue also fall into this timeframe. We can expect PoK to be merged back with India in early to mid-2023. Till then India will concentrate on being prepared in every aspect for a full-scale war.
